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ABSTRACT: Regaining the military advantage in the Indo-Pacific
region requires renewed thinking about the US military footprint
there, particularly the role of the US Army. The Army’s deterrence
and partnering capabilities will be best utilized by engaging its longrange and precision-strike capabilities in a regional “Ring of Fires”
concept and further enhanced as part of a broader revitalization and
expansion of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue.

T

he US Department of Defense and its Indo-Pacific Command
(INDOPACOM) are grappling with how to regain military
advantage in the region amid a global pandemic and looming
defense budget cuts. The US Army’s specific challenge centers on
becoming a more effective enabler for the Joint Force, an aim the Army
can best accomplish by combining its special deterrence and relationshipbuilding capacities into a two-pronged action plan. Regarding the
first prong, deterrence, the Army should leverage its long-range and
precision-strike capabilities to form a Ring of Fires that could target
China’s critical land-based and maritime assets. Concerning the second
prong, relationship-building, the Army should work toward augmenting
and operationalizing the multidomain military capabilities of India and
the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue—a strategic-level forum comprised
of the United States, Japan, Australia, and India —along with the support
of key allies, the United Kingdom, and France: a “Quad Plus.”

Introduction

Most experts agree the Indo-Pacific region is the fulcrum for the
future global security order and thus of critical concern for the new US
administration. As the 2018 National Defense Strateg y ominously warned,
“China . . . seeks Indo-Pacific regional hegemony in the near-term
and displacement of the United States to achieve global preeminence
in the future.”1 But the Biden administration faces a revisionist China
rapidly marching toward its intended goals (as outlined in President
Xi Jinping’s “Chinese Dream”) of achieving hegemony in the region
and the unification of Taiwan with China either through coercion
or force.2 Accordingly, US military planners must now provide
1. James N. Mattis, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America:
Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of
Defense (OSD), January 19, 2018), 2, https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018
-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf.
2. “General Secretary Xi Jinping Explicates the ‘Chinese Dream,’ ” Chinese Law and Government
48, no. 6 (November 2016).

Dr. Carol V. Evans,
director of the Strategic
Studies Institute at
the US Army War
College, is an adviser
to the NATO Center
of Excellence-Defense
Against Terrorism, and
she is also a life member
of the Council on
Foreign Relations.

26

Parameters 51(1) Spring 2021

America’s policymakers with bold, visionary strategic thinking and new
operational concepts.
Moreover the United States should supplement its words of
commitment to allies and partners with a plan of action that actively
improves interoperability and military-to-military cooperation. This
article offers just such a strategic and operational roadmap, one that
takes better advantage of the Army’s role in the Indo-Pacific to achieve
greater stability by deterring aggressive activities. This roadmap assumes,
optimistically, the threat posed by the People’s Republic of China (PRC)
will spur greater military cooperation among leading Indo-Pacific
countries, the United States, and other key European countries. But
this roadmap also recognizes the fragile and emergent characteristics of
many of these relationships.
This article examines the threat posed by the PRC’s aggressive
military expansion from the South China Sea to the Indian Ocean and
beyond as well as key PRC military weaknesses that INDOPACOM
and the US Army Pacific Command (USARPAC) should exploit. The
article then details the enabling role the US Army can play vis-à-vis the
Joint Force through a new operational concept called Ring of Fires,
which would see deterrence-oriented Army precision-strike and other
missile capabilities deployed to key locations in the Indo-Pacific region
in an effort to challenge China’s economic survival. Finally, the article
underscores the importance of further relationship building with India
especially, and with the Quad countries, as well as the United Kingdom
and France. Together, the combined military and economic capabilities
of the United States and its allies and strategic partners can create a
formidable security framework for the region.

China’s Military Expansion

American military primacy and its capability to deter aggression and
to maintain a free and open Indo-Pacific have declined. By contrast
China has embarked upon construction of a new security architecture in
the region through huge investments in counterintervention and powerprojection capabilities. Evidence of this expansion includes the PRC’s
unilateral militarization and deployment of anti-access/area-denial (A2/
AD) capabilities to address a Taiwan contingency; its expanded naval
operations in the western Pacific, into the Indian Ocean and the Red
Sea; and the establishment of the first People’s Liberation Army (PLA)
base in Djibouti. Since 2008 the PLA Navy (PLAN) has dispatched 35
naval escort task forces into the Indian Ocean and Gulf of Aden.3
Beijing has buttressed its power-projection capabilities in the region
with a military modernization program that is outpacing the United
States in shipbuilding, land-based conventional ballistic and cruise

3. See James E. Fanell, “China’s Global Navy Eyeing Sea Control by 2030, Superiority
by 2049,” Sunday Guardian Live, June 13, 2020, https://www.sundayguardianlive.com/news
/china-global-navy.
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missiles, and air defense systems.4 Xi’s geostrategic Belt and Road
Initiative (BRI), especially the Maritime Silk Road (also known as the
String of Pearls), underpins this buildup of the PRC’s power projection
and expeditionary warfare capabilities. The Maritime Silk Road is a
soft power means to build overseas basing and logistics infrastructures
to project and sustain PLA ground force—as well as PLAN, Peoples
Liberation Army Marine Corps, and Peoples Liberation Army Rocket
Force—assets throughout the Indo-Pacific.
Located along key global sea lines of communication (SLOCs)
and choke points, Beijing has secured long-term, dual-use, deep-water
port facilities in Australia, Bangladesh, Kenya, Malaysia, the Maldives,
Mauritius, Myanmar, Pakistan, the Seychelles, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, and
Thailand. Many of these ports are owned and operated under long-term
lease agreements, often extracted to repay debts to the PRC. As former
Secretary of Defense Mark Esper cautioned, China is “gaining strategic
influence, access to key resources, and military footholds around the
world” via the Belt and Road Initiative.5 Indeed the sum of these
developments has led observers to lament the loss of American primacy
in the region; in short, Washington has effectively “ceded [the] strategic
initiative” to Beijing.6

Joint Force Enabler

In December 2020 during a major speech regarding the Pentagon’s
need to realign US defense spending more acutely to address the threat
of Chinese expansion, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General
Mark A. Milley commented, “Look, I’m an Army guy. . . . And I love
the Army . . . but the fundamental defense of the United States and the
ability to project power forward will always be for America naval and air
and space power.” 7 As presaged by Milley’s remarks, the Army has long
endeavored to solve the conundrum of how to redefine its supporting
role to the Joint Force in such a way as to regain the advantage in the
Indo-Pacific region.
Successive policy and strategic documents have outlined a Joint
all-domain strategy for the INDOPACOM area of responsibility. This
strategy entails four lines of effort: increasing Joint Force lethality,
strengthening alliances and partnerships, enhancing design and posture,

4. OSD, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China, Annual Report to
Congress (Washington, DC: OSD, 2020), vii.
5. Mark T. Esper, “Secretary of Defense Allies and Partners Remarks at Atlantic Council”
(speech, Atlantic Council, Washington, DC, October 20, 2020), https://www.defense.gov/
Newsroom/Speeches/Speech/Article/2388205/secretary-of-defense-allies-and-partners-remarks
-at-atlantic-council/.
6. Nathan Freier, John Schaus, and William Braun, An Army Transformed: USINDOPACOM
Hypercompetition and US Army Theater Design (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College Press, 2020), 912,
https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/912.
7. Paul McLeary, “CJCS Milley Predicts DoD Budget ‘Bloodletting’ to Fund Navy,” Breaking
Defense, December 3, 2020, https://breakingdefense.com/2020/12/cjcs-milley-predicts-dod
-bloodletting-to-fund-navy-priorities/.
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and exercises and experimentation.8 Within the Joint All-Domain
strategy, the US Army/USARPAC has developed its own multi-domain
operations concept (MDO) which emphasizes Army support to the
Joint Force in the Indo-Pacific region through integrated air defense;
operational maneuver and theater-wide logistics; sustainment, command,
control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance (C4ISR); and long-range precision fires.
For the Army, retooling its capabilities and developing novel
applications of land power, particularly in the “Indo” portion of the
Indo-Pacific, while learning to flip the playbook from supporting to
enabling missions, have been challenging tasks. For instance, recent
analyses of US Army theater design in INDOPACOM highlighted
fundamental weaknesses in the Army’s MDO strategy for the region.9
Key among these findings is the fact the Army and the Joint Force are
essentially “out of position” because they are too heavily invested in
northeast Asia. Additionally the Army’s MDO strategy needs tighter
linkages to the broader Joint theater and to the operating concepts of
its sister services.10
Moreover, five essential strategic partners (based on US mutual
defense treaties) make up the focus of the INDOPACOM/USARPAC
area of responsibility: Australia, Japan, the Philippines, South Korea,
and Thailand. Conspicuously absent from the discussion, however, is
India, a designated US Major Defense Partner and the country with the
largest landmass in the Indian Ocean and the second largest army in the
region after China.
Importantly the future deterrence and countervailing power in
the region will rest on two unassailable strategic factors—geography
and alliances. The US Army’s capabilities regarding geography have
been underappreciated. The second factor, alliances, must focus more
deliberately on India and the Quad Plus. Together these factors provide
the essential foundation for a deterrence concept, a Ring of Fires that
would employ Army precision, long-range strike capabilities to target
PRC land and maritime assets and which, in the unlikely event of war,
would cripple China’s economic means of survival.
Contrary to conventional wisdom, the tyranny of distance does not
necessarily favor Chinese over US forces in the Indo-Pacific. In fact the
PRC has significant disadvantages in the maritime domain due to its
long and vulnerable SLOCs. Beijing’s energy, vital natural resources,
manufacturing supply chains, and export trade must pass through the
Indian and Pacific Oceans. Crucially, the PLAN and China’s merchant
8. See US Department of Defense (DoD), The Department of Defense Indo-Pacific Strategy
Report: Preparedness, Partnerships, and Promoting a Networked Region (Washington, DC: DoD, June 1,
2019); US Army Pacific (USARPAC), USARPAC Strategic Guidance: Competing for a Free and Open
Indo-Pacific (Fort Shafter, HI: USARPAC, November 2018); and US Army Training and Doctrine
Command (TRADOC), The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1
(Washington, DC: US Army TRADOC, 2018).
9. Nathan P. Freier and John H. Schaus, “INDOPACOM through 2030,” Parameters 50, no. 2
(Summer 2020): 27–34, https://press.armywarcollege.edu/parameters/vol50/iss2/5/.
10. Freier, Schaus, and Braun, Army Transformed.

Prospectives 2021: US Strategic Landpower

Evans

29

fleet must transit through the straits of the Indonesian archipelago,
namely, the Malacca, Sunda, and Lombok Straits to the South China
Sea (figure 1). These choke points are critical vulnerabilities, which the
PRC recognizes as such.
When traversing from the Straits of Hormuz, the Gulf of Aden,
and the Cape of Good Hope into the Indian Ocean, Chinese merchant
ships and naval vessels, as well as their military port logistics bases
along the Maritime Silk Road, would be vulnerable to kinetic forms
of attack as well as cyber disruption. Vast geographical distances and
extended SLOCs typically represent vulnerabilities that can be attacked
if insufficiently protected, as witnessed by the campaigns to control
the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans during the Second World War. These
geography-based weaknesses, in combination with recent US Army
modernization efforts and investments in long-range precision strike
and hypersonic missile capabilities, afford the Joint Force a unique and
as yet underutilized means of contributing to a Ring-of-Fires concept
that would support INDOPACOM’s Joint All-Domain operations.

A Ring of Fires

Long-range precision strike capability has traditionally resided
with the US Navy and US Air Force. Yet both the US Army and US
Marine Corps are adding these capabilities to their repertoire.11 The
Army increased its investment in the long-range maritime strike arena
with plans to purchase the Navy’s SM-6 (plus extended range variant)
and Tomahawk, including the Maritime Strike version, and integration
of the Precision Strike Missile (PrSM) long-range, surface-to-surface
missile with a new maritime seeker.12 Also, following its September
2020 exercise, Project Convergence, the Army announced its intention
to include experiments linking Army command and control for
coordinating strikes against maritime targets, as well as anti-ship missile
tests, in its 2021 exercise.13
Similarly the US Navy and Marine Corps have initiated Project
Overmatch to coordinate and link fires from multiple platforms using
automation and artificial intelligence to streamline targeting cycles.
A key issue for INDOPACOM is, how are these parallel precision
strike efforts to be coordinated at the Joint level in the future? In
particular, how can the US Army’s potentially larger, more mobile, and
11. Jake Yeager, “Expeditionary Advanced Maritime Operations: How the Marine Corps Can
Avoid Becoming a Second Land Army in the Pacific,” War on the Rocks, December 26, 2019,
https://warontherocks.com/2019/12/expeditionary-advanced-maritime-operations-how-the
-marine-corps-can-avoid-becoming-a-second-land-army-in-the-pacific/; and David B. Larter,
“Are the US Army and US Marine Corps Competing for Missions in the Pacific?” Defense News,
October 14, 2020, https://www.defensenews.com/digital-show-dailies/ausa/2020/10/14/are-the
-us-army-and-us-marine-corps-competing-for-missions-in-the-pacific/.
12. See Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., “Army Picks Tomahawk & SM-6 for Mid-Range
Missiles,” Breaking Defense, November 6, 2020, https://breakingdefense.com/2020/11
/army-picks-tomahawk-sm-6-for-mid-range-missiles/.
13. Steve Trimble and Lee Hudson, “U.S. Army Flexes New Land-Based, Anti-Ship
Capabilities,” Aviation Week, October 20, 2020, https://aviationweek.com/defense-space
/missile-defense-weapons/us-army-flexes-new-land-based-anti-ship-capabilities.
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Figure 1. Army Ring of Fires
(Map by Pete McPhail)
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weapons-capable arrayed strike footprint be best deployed, and under
what future operational construct by the Joint Force?
Notionally the aim of the Ring-of-Fires concept is to target the
China’s SLOCs and choke points for energy and trade, its sea- and
land-based logistics, and PRC resupply and sustainment capabilities. As
depicted in figure 1, the critical Malacca, Lombok, and Sunda Straits
could be controlled by US Army, Marine Corps, and allied missile
batteries and other armaments. Missile capabilities could involve anti-air
and surface maritime attack. These attack vectors are based primarily
on Army precision strike weapons including future hypersonic missiles.
Using Multi-Domain task forces, the Army’s targeting plan
would be maritime attack against PRC surface warships and merchant
shipping. The targeting plan is based on Army missile ranges and missile
warheads for different functions. The ability to put at risk the PLAN
and merchant fleets, to fire on the SLOCs that sustain overseas PLA
expeditionary forces, and to do so while signaling the means to hold the
Chinese economy hostage would credibly demonstrate US commitment,
and that of its allies and strategic partners, to maintaining peace and
stability in the region.
But the concept would require the Army to reposition to a broader
range of firing and logistics positions than it currently occupies. This
repositioning would include the deployment or redeployment of Army
artillery and missile units on support ships or commercial vessels using a
containerized, “guns in a box” approach or mobile missile bases at sea.14
Just as important, this concept would also require an alliance structure
redesign for INDOPACOM. Strengthening relations with key allies and
partners in the Indo-Pacific is essential to providing access, logistics
support, pre-positioning of stocks, and sustainment activities.
Basing will also play a key role in the development of a Ring of Fires.
New bases could be achieved either through new status of forces-type
agreements that permit basing, training, joint exercises, interoperability,
and joint unified command, control, communications, computers,
intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and targeting (C4ISRT), or
less formal, incremental capacity-building agreements such as those in
place between the United States and India. Secure pre-positioned and
mobile sites for the US Army are critical. These sites must be planned to
ensure minimal detectability. Deception must figure prominently in this
plan as well with constant updates based on intelligence assessments of
PRC surveillance and reconnaissance.
Weapon logistics is another factor along with base survivability.
Deception, camouflage, electronic and cyber warfare, and mobility
will enhance survivability from PRC surprise or short-timeline attacks.
Additionally Army security force assistance brigades could be deployed
to build partner multidomain operations and strike capabilities in the
14. See Captain J. W. “Stretch” Phillips, US Navy (Retired), and Dr. Anthony Wells, “Put the
Guns in a Box,” Proceedings, June 2018, https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2018/june
/put-guns-box.
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INDOPACOM region including in Australia, Brunei, India, Indonesia,
Japan, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam.
While some of these countries may be unwilling to countervail China
openly or militarily, the Biden administration must develop a cohesive
political-military-economic framework for the region that includes all of
them, should their inclusion become necessary at a later date.
Command and control for execution of the concept would require
redundant facilities, some fixed, some mobile, and all interoperable.
The NATO model, such as the Joint Warfare facility at Northwood,
United Kingdom, may present initial baseline capabilities for interallied
command, control, and communications. So too, future command and
control solutions may arise from the Joint Staff Bold Quest initiative,
which is examining allied connectivity for All-Domain command and
control operations, as well as from the US Army’s Fires Capabilities
Development and Integration Directorate Battle Lab, which allows allies
to “join and test the compatibility of their own command and control
networks and capabilities with those of the US service and other allies.”15
In sum the Ring-of-Fires concept provides the US Army with a
crucial operational mission tied directly and firmly to enabling the Joint
Force. Strategically it enables the United States to maintain a favorable
military balance sufficient to deter China and to support a free and open
Indo-Pacific theater. Nevertheless this concept cannot succeed without
allies. As noted in the US Department of Defense’s Indo-Pacific Strategy
Report, “the challenges we face in the Indo-Pacific extend beyond what
any single country can address alone.”16

Alliances and Strategic Partnerships

While the current INDOPACOM alliance posture is already
centered on five anchor relationships, one may well argue India is
the most important anchor of all. Not only does India have unique
geographic advantage and increasing military capabilities vis-à-vis its
erstwhile adversary China, but India is also the epicenter of the Quad
Plus. In the closing days of his tenure as US secretary of defense, Mark
Esper reflected, “India will well be the most consequential partner
for us, I think, in the Indo Pacific for sure in this century.”17 The
disconnection between this statement by a US defense secretary and the
lack of a demonstrative focus on India in INDOPACOM and USARPAC
strategy documents is striking.
Although not without its limits for the time being, a strategic
convergence of sorts is emerging between the United States and India,
due largely to the increasing threat environment created by China. That
15. Theresa Hitchens, “ ‘Bold Quest’ to Demo Allied Connectivity for All-Domain Ops,”
Breaking Defense, August, 24, 2020, https://breakingdefense.com/2020/08/bold-quest-to-demo
-allied-connectivity-for-all-domain-ops/.
16. DoD, Indo-Pacific Strategy Report, 16.
17. “India Will Be Most Consequential Partner for U.S. in Indo-Pacific This Century:
Esper,” Hindu, October 21, 2020, https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/india-will-be-most
-consequential-partner-for-us-in-indo-pacific-this-century-esper/article32905679.ece.
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threat environment includes the ongoing Sino-Indo conflict along the
Line of Actual Control (LAC) in eastern Ladakh; the PRC’s military
support of neighboring Pakistan, which has launched successive
terrorist attacks against India; the encirclement of India on land and
at sea via the BRI China-Pakistan Economic Corridor; and the use of
Maritime Silk Road infrastructure investments to usurp India’s role as
a regional net provider with smaller Indian Ocean neighbors.18 These
geostrategic vectors, along with a more proactive foreign policy approach
by Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, make it realistic to discuss
ways to strengthen the US-Indo bilateral relationship and leverage the
multilateral capabilities of the Quad Plus.
In fact the burgeoning US-India defense relationship is the
product of four cornerstones.19 The first cornerstone consists of policy
pronouncements, such as the designation in 2016 of India as a Major
Defense Partner (a status unique to India and commensurate with the
relationships shared with only the closest of American allies) and highlevel 2+2 ministerial meetings.20 The second cornerstone is the major
defense logistics and tactical intelligence-sharing protocols between
the United States and India, including the 2002 General Security
of Military Information Agreement, the 2016 Logistics Exchange
Memorandum of Agreement, the 2018 Communications Compatibility
and Security Agreement, the Basic Exchange and Cooperation
Agreement for Geospatial Intelligence, and the Maritime Information
Sharing Technical Agreement, the latter two of which were signed in
October 2020.21
The third cornerstone consists of defense sales and trade and
technology cooperation, especially the recent sale of Poseidon P-8I
aircraft and expected exports of armed Predator-B UAVs. The fourth
cornerstone—or foundation stone—lies in the military relationship that
exists between the two countries. Evidence for this relationship can be
found in training exercises such as the annual Malabar naval exercise,
Army and Special Forces exercises Yudh Abhyas and Vajra Prahar,
respectively, and the first tri-service Tiger Triumph amphibious exercise.
To be sure military cooperation between the United States and
India has been more robust between the two navies. That cooperation
has centered on augmenting India’s maritime domain awareness and
anti-submarine warfare capabilities to help countervail the PLAN’s
growing expeditionary and undersea presence in the Indo-Pacific. By
18. See Darshana M. Baruah, “India in the Indo-Pacific: New Delhi’s Theater of Opportunity”
(Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2020).
19. See Sumit Ganguly and M. Chris Mason, An Unnatural Partnership? The Future of U.S.-India
Strategic Cooperation (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College Press, May 2019),
https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/924/.pdf.
20. Joint Statement, “The United States and India: Enduring Global Partners in the 21st
Century,” White House (website), June 7, 2016, http://go.usa.gov/x8EFV.
21. Santosh Chaubey, “BECA, MITSA Deals between India-US Will Strengthen Strategic
Alliance, Challenge China’s Growing Military Ambitions,” News 18 India, October 27, 2020,
https://www.news18.com/news/india/beca-mitsa-deals-between-india-us-will-strengthen
-strategic-alliance-challenge-chinas-growing-military-ambitions-3011390.html.
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contrast cooperation between the US Army and the Indian Army has
experienced impediments. Some analysts have pointed to the Indian
Army’s posture which is focused on insurgency, counterterrorism, and
border protection rather than force projection; others have suggested
bilateral army exercises are too small and narrowly structured to be an
effective means of relationship and capacity building; and still other
analysts have noted the lack of interoperability is not helped by an
overreliance on Russian weapon supplies.22
Still, as signaled by the Indian Army vice chief’s visit to
INDOPACOM and USARPAC in fall 2020, there are avenues to enhance
further operational and strategic level collaboration between the two
armies.23 Some immediate opportunities include intelligence sharing
related to border security and counterterrorism, as well as Special Forces
training and professional military education (PME).24 Each of these
areas deserves their own deliberative Army-to-Army formal assessment,
but for brevity’s sake, some key cooperative prospects are highlighted.

Intelligence Sharing

The PLA military incursions along the Sino-Indian border LAC
in May 2020 revealed many intelligence deficiencies for the Indian
Army, including lack of indications and warning over PLA intentions,
insufficient military satellite coverage, and other C4ISR weaknesses.25
Taken together they highlight enormous potential for increased
US-Indian Army intelligence cooperation and assistance. For example
the US Army’s National Ground Intelligence Center in Charlottesville,
Virginia, and US Special Operations Command Intelligence Division
could work with their Indian counterparts to assist in border protection
and counterterrorist intelligence operations. The US Army could
provide technical know-how to develop a C4ISRT system designed to
meet India’s specific needs along the borders.
A common operating picture would enable an intelligence-based,
real-time indications and warning system. This C4ISRT system could
alert to threats pertaining to border incursions, terrorist plans and
movements, and any major nuclear posture changes or actions by either
China or Pakistan, or both, that may threaten Indian and US interests
22. See C. Christine Fair, “US-Indian Army-to-Army Relations: Prospects for Future Coalition
Operations,” Asian Security 1, no. 2 (April 2005): 157–73; and M. Chris Mason, “Less Than Meets
the Eye: A Critical Assessment of the Military-to-Military Dimension of the U.S.-India Security
Partnership,” in The Future of U.S.-India Security Cooperation, ed. Šumit Ganguly and M. Chris Mason
(Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, forthcoming).
23. Huma Siddiqui, “Deeper Military Cooperation between India and the US: Vice Chief of
Indian Army Visiting America,” Financial Express, October 16, 2020, https://www.financialexpress
.com/lifestyle/health/deeper-military-cooperation-between-india-and-the-us-vice-chief-of-indian
-army-visiting-america/2107121/.
24. See Carol V. Evans, “A Vision for Future U.S.-India Intelligence Cooperation,” in The Future
of US-India Security Cooperation, ed. Šumit Ganguly and M. Chris Mason (Manchester, UK: University
of Manchester Press, forthcoming).
25. Sameer Lalwani, “Revelations and Opportunities: What the United States Can Learn from
the Sino-Indian Crisis,” War on the Rocks, July 10, 2020, https://warontherocks.com/2020/07
/revelations-and-opportunities-what-the-united-states-can-learn-from-the-sino-indian-crisis/; and
Evans, “Vision for Future.”
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and stability in the region. Additionally the United States could assist
India by supplementing the current Poseidon P-8I surveillance mission
with deployments of, for example, Joint Stars, Rivet Joint aircraft, or
Global Hawk UAVs.26

Training and Professional Military Education

The Indian military has identified the need to improve its special
forces.27 These forces remain limited in number and are not considered
intelligence collection assets in ways that the US Special Forces operate.
In this regard US Army Special Operations Forces can assist with
training, data exchanges, and operational planning support with Indian
forces, in concert with regular exercises and personnel exchanges in
both the United States and India. Part of this process can include special
penetration and exfiltration operations, deception, counterterrorism
training, network penetration, and psychological warfare. The US
Army, through US Special Operations Command and with the
assistance of INDOPACOM, can help create a similar integrated special
operations command initially designated for Indian border protection,
counterterrorism, and infiltration missions.
With regard to US-Indian PME engagement, the current footprint
is too small and could be greatly expanded. India’s own professional
military education establishment has come under fire for its military
insularity, lack of civilian participation, and emphasis on training
over education.28 Critics have suggested India’s PME system needs
to be revamped along the US and UK models.29 These factors and
a lack of jointness within the Indian military establishment point to
areas for US-Indian PME cooperation, especially given China’s recent
restructuring of the PLA into a force capable of managing and conducting
joint operations. In the near-term, the US Army’s professional military
education institutions could collaborate more, for example, with India’s
relatively new National Defense University.

Quad Plus

With the US military posture weighted in the western Pacific,
Washington has increasingly leaned on New Delhi to be the
countervailing power in the Indo-Pacific, leading to high expectations
and pressures on the bilateral relationship on the part of the United
States. Fortunately the Quad has been resurrected from its somewhat
26. Mansij Asthana, “What Is US’ Deadliest Submarine Killer – The P-8 Poseidon Doing at
15,000 Feet on India-China Border?” Eurasian Times, November 27, 2020, https://eurasiantimes
.com/what-is-us-most-lethal-submarine-killer-the-p-8-poseidon-doing-on-india-china-border-at
-15000-feet/.
27. Saikat Datta, “India Tries and Fails to Improve Its Special Operations Forces,” Asia Times,
May 31, 2019, https://www.asiatimes.com/2019/05/article/india-tries-to-improve-its-special
-ops-capability/.
28. Prakash Menon, “Military Education in India: Missing the Forest for the Trees,” Journal
of Defence Studies 9, no. 4 (October–December 2015): 49–69, https://idsa.in/system/files/jds
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moribund state due to members’ converging concerns regarding China’s
increasingly assertive and coercive military and economic behavior in
the region.30 The Quad foreign ministers’ in-person meeting in Tokyo
in October 2020 and Australia’s participation for the first time since
2007 in the November 2020 Quad-based, Indian-hosted Malabar
exercise were important signaling measures demonstrating the potential
countervailing capabilities of these strategic partners against China.
That RIMPAC-like exercise was conducted in November 2020 with
the four Quad navies (US Navy, Japan Maritime Self Defense Force,
Royal Australian Navy, and Indian Navy) conducting joint operations
centered on the Indian Vikramaditya carrier battle group and the US
Nimitz carrier strike group.31
The two “Plus” regional players are the United Kingdom and
France. The United Kingdom provides the geostrategic base in Diego
Garcia and has just deployed the HMS Queen Elizabeth aircraft carrier
(on its maiden voyage) and its carrier strike group to the Indian Ocean
and South China Sea. France’s naval bases in Djibouti and the Reunion
Islands already provide logistical support for India’s mission-based
deployments in the Indian Ocean, Gulf of Aden, and the Persian Gulf.
Furthermore expanding the Quad into a Quad Plus would leverage
the capacities of individual members to mount and conduct joint
operations but without engaging in a formal military alliance structure
such as NATO. Accordingly INDOPACOM and USARPAC could
work to expand the current focus of the Quad, which is maritime/
naval-centric, to assist in building multidomain, interoperable military
competencies across the land, air, space, and cyber domains. This
expansion can be achieved through greater intelligence sharing and
collaboration, including those of the “Five Eyes” alliance. Intelligence
sharing is an essential step in operationalizing the Quad alliance.
Additionally the numerous bilateral logistical agreements among
the Quad Plus members could be networked to provide the grid for
launching a larger allied Ring of Fires for basing and pre-positioning
of supplies and other logistics support for distributed All-Domain
operations. Refocusing INDOPACOM’s exercises and those among
the Quad Plus members on the environment for allied multidomain
interoperability and joint operations is another component as well. Just
as we have seen the establishment of combined Joint task forces in the
Horn of Africa and in the Middle East, task forces could be established
in the Indo-Pacific as a further means of providing the persistent
forward presence necessary to deter and moderate PRC behavior, and, if
necessary, defeat any Chinese aggression across all domains of warfare.

30. Tanvi Madan, “The Rise, Fall, and Rebirth of the ‘Quad,’ ” War on the Rocks, November 16,
2017, https://warontherocks.com/2017/11/rise-fall-rebirth-quad/.
31. Express News Service, “Malabar Exercise Concludes in Arabian Sea,” Indian Express,
November 21, 2020, https://indianexpress.com/article/india/malabar-exercise-concludes-in
-arabian-sea-7059693/.
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Regaining and maintaining US strategic advantages in the
Indo-Pacific will be vital for protecting American interests in the region.
America’s window of vulnerability is open, but that window also offers
opportunities to recast US military strategies, capabilities, and alliances.
With a forward-looking roadmap the US Army can become an even more
important enabler to the Joint Force in INDOPACOM. At the core of its
efforts to do so should be an emphasis on leveraging its investments in
precision strike capabilities to operationalize the Ring-of-Fires concept
and strengthening its relations with the Indian Army and the Quad
Plus militaries.
As an immediate first step, INDOPACOM must develop a proof of
concept for the Ring of Fires with Australia, India, and Japan. Using war
games and discrete military exercises among these Quad stakeholders,
the Ring of Fires could be tested, refined, and operationalized.
Second, INDOPACOM must focus on incremental alliance building
with smaller states and in support of India’s many regional initiatives.
Finally, INDOPACOM must also coordinate with the Department of
State and other interagency players, such as the Commerce and Treasury
Departments, to bring to bear the full panoply of US diplomatic, political,
and economic instruments to demonstrate a renewed US commitment
to the region, a commitment aimed not only at countering the inroads
China has made via the Belt and Road Initiative but also building the
foundation for continued peace and stability.

